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22 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE ETHICS OF SELF - LEARNING ROBOTS 
Shannon Vallor and George A. Bekey 
The convergence of robotics technology with the science of artificial 
intelligence ( or AI) is rapidly enabling the development of robots that 
emulate a wide range of intelligent human behaviors.1 Recent advances 
in machine learning techniques have produced significant gains in the 
ability of artificial agents to perform or even excel in activities for-
merly thought to be the exclusive province of human intelligence, 
including abstract problem-solving, perceptual recognition, social 
interaction, and natural language use. These developments raise a host 
of new ethical concerns about the responsible design, manufacture, 
and use of robots enabled with artificial intelligence-particularly 
those equipped with self-learning capacities. 
The potential public benefits of self-learning robots are immense. 
Driverless cars promise to vastly reduce human fatalities on the road 
while boosting transportation efficiency and reducing energy use. 
Robot medics with access to a virtual ocean of medical case data 
might one day be able to diagnose patients with far greater speed and 
reliability than even the best-trained human counterparts. Robots 
tasked with crowd control could predict the actions of a dangerous 
mob well before the signs are recognizable to law enforcement officers. 
Such applications, and many more that will emerge, have the poten-
tial to serve vital moral interests in protecting human life, health, and 
well-being. 
Yet as this chapter will show, the ethical risks posed by AI-enabled 
robots are equally serious-especially since self-learning systems 
behave in ways that cannot always be anticipated or folly under-
stood, even by their programmers. Some warn of a future where Al 
escapes our control, or even turns against humanity (Standage 2016); 
but other, far less cinematic dangers are much nearer ro hand and are 
virrually certain to cause great harms if not promptly addressed by 
Al and the Ethics of Self-Learning Robots • 339 
technologists, lawmakers, and ocher stakeholders. The task of ensuring the eth-
ical design, manufacture, use, and governance of AI-enabled robots and other 
artificial agents is thus as critically important as it is vast. 
22.l What Is Artificial Intelligence? 
The nature of human intelligence has been one of the great mysteries since the 
earliest days of civilization. It has been attributed to God or civilization or acci-
dental mutations, bur there is general agreement that it is our brain and the intel-
ligence it exhibits that separates humans from ocher animals. For centuries it 
was thought that a machine would never be able to emulate human thinking. 
Yet at present there are numerous computer programs that emulate some aspect 
of human intelligence, even if none can perform all the cognitive functions of a 
human brain. The earliest computer programs to exhibit some behavioral aspect 
of intelligence began to appear in the second half of the twentieth century. 2 The 
first meaningful test of a computer's approximation to human intelligence was 
proposed by Alan Turing (1950). He called it the "imitation game;' more com-
monly known today as the "Turing Test." 
The idea is the following: An investigator submits written queries to the 
computer, which replies in writing. The computer passes the test if, afi:er a suit-
able time interval, the average investigator has no better than a 70% chance of 
correctly determining whether the responses come from a person or a com-
puter. The general utility and significance of the Turing Test for Al research 
are widely contested (Moor 2003; Russell and Norvig 2010). Its focus on a sys-
tem's appearance to users in a tightly controlled setting, rather than the cog-
nitive architecture or internal operations of the system, may appear to bypass 
the basic point of the test: namely, to demonstrate a cognitive faculty. The test 
also excludes many other types of intelligent performance that do not involve 
conversational ability. Still, it is noteworthy that in an annual competition held 
since 1991 (the Loebner Prize), no system has passed an unrestricted version of 
the test-repeatedly defying predictions by many researchers (Turing included) 
that computers would display conversational intelligence by the twenty-first 
century (Moor 2003). 
While there are many unresolved questions about what it would take for a 
machine to demonstrate possession of "real" intelligence of the general sore pos-
sessed by humans, the chief goal of most AI researchers is more modest: sys-
tems that can emulate, augment, or compete with the performance of intelligent 
humans in well-defined tasks.3 In this sense, the pragmatic legacy of the Turing 
Test endures. This figurative, cask-delimited definition of artificial intelligence is 
the one we shall employ in the rest of this chapter, unless otherwise stated. It 
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with the full range of cognitive capacities typically possessed by humans, includ-
ing self-awareness. Most AI researchers characterize che laccer achievement, 
often referred to as "artificial general intelligence" or AGI, as at best a long-cerm 
prospect-not an emerging reality.4 
Artificial agents wich specific forms of cask intelligence, on the ocher hand, 
are already here among us. In many cases they not only compete with but hand-
ily 011tpe1farm human agents, a trend that is projected co accelerate rapidly with 
ongoing advances in techniques of machine Learning. Moreover, che implementa-
tion of cask-specific AI systems in robotic systems is further expanding che range 
and variety of AI agents and the kinds of social roles they can occupy. Such trends 
are projected co yield significant gains in global productivity, knowledge produc-
tion, and instirncional efficiency (Kaplan 2015). Yee as we will sec, they also carry 
profound social, economic, and ethical risks. 
22.2 Artificial Intelligence and the Ethics 
of Machine Learning 
Many ethical concerns about AI research and its robotic applications are asso-
ciated with a rapidly emerging domain of computer science known as machine 
Learning. As with learning in animals, machine learning is a developmental proc-
ess in which repeated exposures of a system to an information-rich environment 
gradually produce, expand, enhance, or reinforce chat system's behavioral and 
cognitive competence in that environment or relevantly similar ones. Learning 
produces changes in the state of the system that endure for some time, often 
through some mechanism of explicit or implicit memory formation. 
One important approach co machine learning is modeled on networks in the 
central nervous system and is known as neural network learning or, more accu-
rately, artificial neural network (ANN) Learning For simplicity, we omit che word 
artificial in the following discussion. A neural network consists of a sec of input 
nodes representing various features of che source or input data and a set of output 
nodes representing the desired control actions. Between che input and output 
node layers are "hidden" layers of nodes that function to process the input data, 
for example, by extracting features chat are especially relevant to the desired out-
puts. Connections between che nodes have numerical "weights" chat can be mod-
ified with che help of a learning algorithm; the algorithm allows che network to 
be "trained" with each new input pattern until the network weights are adjusted 
in such a way that the relationship between input and output layers is optimized. 
Thus the network gradually "learns" from repeated "experience" (multiple train-
ing runs with input datasets) how to optimize the machine's "behavior" (outputs) 
for a given kind of task. 
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While machine learning can model cognitive architectures other than neural 
networks, interest in neural networks has grown in recent years with the addition 
of more hidden layers giving depth to such networks, as well as feedback or recur-
rent layers. The adjustment of the connection strengths in these more complex 
networks belongs to a loosely defined group of techniques known as deep learn-
ing. Among other applications of AI-especially those involvingcomputer vision, 
natural language, or audio processing-the performance of self-driving "robotic 
cars" has been improved significantly by the use of deep learning techniques. 
Machine learning techniques also vary in terms of the degree to which the 
learning is supervised, chat is, the extent to which the training data is explicitly 
labeled by humans to tell the system which classifications it should learn to make 
(as opposed co letting the system construct its own classifications or groupings). 
While many other programming methods can be embedded in AI systems, 
including "top-down" rule-based controls ("If a right turn is planned, activate 
right turn signal 75 meters prior co turn"), real-world contingencies are often too 
numerous, ambiguous, or unpredictable to effectively manage without the aid of 
machine learning techniques. 
For a self-driving car, the inputs will include real-time data about road condi-
tions, illumination, speed, GPS location, and desired destination. The outputs 
will include the computed values of controlled variables, such as pressure on the 
accelerator (gas) pedal, steering commands (e.g., "Turn the steering wheel 30 
degrees clockwise"), and so on. Hidden layers of nodes will be sensitive to a wide 
range of salient patterns that might be detected in the inputs (e.g., input patterns 
indicating a bicyclist on the right side of the roadway) in ways that shape the 
proper outputs ("Slow down slightly, edge to the left-center of the lane"). 
Before it is capable of driving safely in real-world conditions, however, the 
car's network must be "trained" by a learning algorithm to predict the appropri-
ate machine outputs (driving behaviors) for a wide variety of inputs and goals. 
Learning cakes place by adjustment of the gains or weights between the nodes 
of the network's input, hidden, and output layers. Initial training of a network 
in simulations is followed by controlled field tests, where the network is imple-
mented and trained in a physical car. Once the proper connection strengths are 
determined by the training process, the input-output behavior of the network 
becomes an approximation co the behavior of the system being modeled: in our 
example, a well-driven car. \Vhile an artificial neural network's cognitive struc-
ture may bear little resemblance to the neural structure of a competent human 
d river, once it can reliably approximate the input-output behavior typical of such 
drivers, we may say the network has learned co drive. 
Once the network is judged sufficiently competent and reliable in controlled 
cescs, additional fine-tuning of its performance might then take place "in the wild;' 
that is, in uncontrolled real-world conditions-as in the case of Tesla's autopilot 
342 • SHANNON VALLOR AND GEORGE A. BEKEY 
feature. Here we begin to confront important ethical questions emerging from 
Al's implementation in a robot or other system chat can autonomously act and 
make irreversible changes in the physical world. Media outlets have widely cov-
ered the ethics of autonomous cars, especially the prospect of real-world "trolley 
problems" generated by the cask of programming cars co make morally challeng-
ing trade-offs between the safety of its passengers, occupants of ocher cars, and 
pedestrians (Achenbach 2015). Yee "trolley problems" do nor exhaust or even 
necessarily address the core ethical issues raised by artificially intelligent and 
autonomous robotic syscems.5 This chapter focuses on a range of ethical issues 
less commonly addressed in media coverage of AI and robotics. 
First, consider that driverless cars are intended to make roads safer for humans, 
who are notoriously unsafe drivers. This goal has prima facie ethical merit, for 
who would deny chat fewer car wrecks is a moral good? To accomplish it, how-
ever, one must t rain artificial networks ro drive better than we do. Like humans, 
self-learning machines gain competence in part by learning from their mistakes. 
l11e most fertile grounds for driving mistakes are real-world roadways, populated 
by loose dogs, fallen trees, wandering deer, potholes, and drunk, texting, or sleepy 
drivers. Bue is it ethical to allow people on public roads to be unwitting test sub-
jects for a driverless car's training runs? 
Tesla's customers voluntarily sign up for chis risk in exchange for the excite-
ment and convenience of the latest driving technology, but pedestrians and other 
drivers who might be on the wrong end of an autopilot mistake have entered 
into no such contract. Is it ethical for a company to impose such risks on us, even 
if the risks are statistically small, without public discussion or legislative over-
sight? Should the public be compensated for such testing, since Tesla-a private 
company-profits handsomely if che tests resulc in a more commercially viable 
technology? Or should we accept that since the advancement of d riverless tech-
nology is in the long-term public interest, we (or our children} will be compen-
sated by Tesla with vastly safer roads five, ten, or twenty years from now? 
Moreover, does ethics permit the unwitting sacrifice of chose who might be 
endangered today by a machine learning its way in rhe world, as long as we can 
reasonably hope that many ochers will be saved by the same technology tomor-
row? Here we see an implicit confl ict emerging between different ethical theo-
ries; a utilitarian may well license such sacrifices in the interests of greater human 
happiness, while a Kantian would regard them as fundamentally immoral. 
Similar questions can be asked about other applications of machine learning. 
For example, should a future robot medic, well trained in simulations and con-
trolled tests, be allowed co fine-tune its network in the field with real, injured 
victims of an earthquake or mass shooting, who might be further endangered 
by the robot's error? Does the prospect look more ethically justifiable if we rea-
sonably believe chis will increase the likeliliood of one day having extraordinary 
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robot medics that can save many more lives than we currently can with only 
human medics? 
Imagine that we decide the long-term public benefit does justify the risk. 
Even the most powerful and well-trained artificial networks are not wholly pre-
dictable. Statistically they may be competit ive with or even superior to humans 
at a given task, but unforeseen outputs-sometimes quite odd ones-are a rare 
but virtually ineradicable possibility. Some are emergent behaviors produced by 
interactions in large, complex systems.6 O thers are simple failures of an otherwise 
reliable system to model the desired output. A well-known example of the latter 
is IBM's Watson, which handily beat the best human]eopardy! players in 2011 
but nevertheless gave a few answers that even novice human players would have 
known were wrong, such as the notorious "Toronto" answer ro a Final Jeopardy 
question about "U.S. Cities." 
In the context of TV entertainment, this was a harmless, amusing mistake-
and a helpful reminder that even the smartest machines aren't perfect. Yet today 
\Vatson for Oncology is employed by more than a dozen cancer centers in the 
United States to "offer oncologists and people with cancer individualized treat-
ment options" (IBM \Vatson 2016). \Vatson's diagnoses and treatment plans are 
still vetted by licensed oncologists. Still, how reliably can a human expert distin-
guish between a novel, unexpected treatment recommendation by Watson that 
might save a patient's life-something that has reportedly already happened in 
Japan (David 2016)-and the oncological equivalent of "Toronto"? At least in 
the context of oncology, a physician mn take time to investigate and evaluate 
Watson's recommendations; but how can we insulate ourselves from che unpre-
dictability of systems such as self-driving cars, in which the required speed of 
operation and decision-making may render real-time human supervision virtually 
impossible to implement? 
Ideally, responsible creators of self-learning systems will allow them to oper-
ate "in the wild" only when their statistical failure rate in controlled settings is 
markedly lower than chat of the average human performing the same cask. Still, 
who should we hold responsible when a robot or ocher artificial agent does injure 
a person while honing its intelligence in the real world? Consider a catastrophic 
machine "error" chat was not introduced by human programmers, could not have 
been specifically predicted by chem, and thus could not have been prevented, 
except by not allowing the machine to ace and learn in society in the first place.7 
\Vhat, if any, safeguards should be put in place to mitigate such losses, and who is 
responsible for making this happen? Lawmakers? Manufacturers? Individual AI 
scientists and programmers? Consumer groups? Insurance companies? We need 
a public conversation among affected stakeholders about what a just distribution 
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A related ethical issue concerns the very different degrees and types of risk 
that may be imposed by artificial agents on individuals and society. Allowing a 
self-driving security robot to patrol a mall food court risks bruising an errant 
toddler's foot, which is bad enough (Vincent 2016). It is quite another order of 
risk-magnitude to unleash a self-learning robot in a 2-ton metal chassis travel-
ing public roads at highway speed, or to arm it with lethal weapons, or to link a 
self-learning agent up to critical power systems. Yet there are also significant risks 
involved with not employing self-learning systems, particularly in contexts such 
as driving and medicine where human error is a large and ineradicable source of 
grievous harms. If sound policy informed by careful ethical reflection does not 
begin to form soon around these questions of risk and responsibility in self-learn-
ing systems, the safety of innocent people and the long-term future of AI research 
may be gravely endangered. 
22.3 Broader Ethical Concerns about Artificially 
Intel ligent Robots 
Not all ethical quandaries about AI-enabled robots are specific to their imple-
mentation of machine learning. Many such concerns apply to virtually any 
artificial agent capable of autonomous action in the world. These include such 
challenges as meaningful human oversight and control of Al; algorithmic opacity 
and hidden machine bias; widespread technologiml unemployment; psychological 
and emotional manipulation of humans by Al; and automation bias. 
22.3.1 Meaningful Human Control and Oversight of Al 
Society has an ethical interest in meaningful human control and oversight of AI, 
for several reasons. The first arises from the general ethical principle that humans 
are morally responsible for our chosen actions. Since, unlike our children, Al-
enabled systems come into the world formed by deliberate human design, humans 
are in a deep sense always momlly accountable for the effects of such agents on the 
world. It would therefore seem plainly irresponsible for humans to allow mean-
ingful control or oversight of an artificial agent's actions to slip from our grasp. 
A second reason for our ethical interest in meaningful human control and 
oversight of AI is its rapidly expanding scope of action. Al-enabled systems 
already operate in real-world contexts like driving and medicine that involve mat-
ters oflife and death, as well as other core dimensions of human flourishing. Thus 
the effects of AI in the world for which humans are responsible-positive and 
negative-are of increasing mom! gravity. This trend will strengthen as artificial 
systems demonstrate ever-greater competence and reliability in contexts with 
very high moral stakes (Wallach 2015). 
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As ethically fundamental as human responsibility for AI may be, the prac-
tical challenges of maintaining meaningful human control and oversight are 
immense. In addition to the aforementioned risk of emergent or other unpre-
dictable AI behaviors, there are strong counter-pressures to limit human con-
trol and oversight of AI. Human supervisors are costly to employ, potentially 
reducing the profit to be reaped from automating a key task. Humans are also 
far slower to judge and act than are computers, so efficiency gains too can be 
diminished by our control. In many applications, such as driving, Right control, 
and financial trading, the entire function of the system will presuppose speeds 
and scales of decision-making beyond human reach. There is also the question 
of when our judgments warrant more epistemic authority or epistemic trust than 
machine judgments. If an artificially intelligent system has consistently demon-
strated statistically greater competence than humans in a certain cask, on what 
grounds do we give a human supervisor the power to challenge or override its 
decisions? 
1he difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that self-learning robots often oper-
ate in ways that are opaque to humans, even their programmers (Pasquale 2015). 
\'Ve must face the prospect of a growing disconnect between human and artificial 
forms of "expertise;' a gap that should d isturb us for several reasons. First, it risks 
the gradual devaluation of distinctly human skills and modes of understanding. 
Human expertise often expresses important moral and intellectual virtues miss-
ing from AI (such as perspective, empathy, integrity, aesthetic style, and civic-
mindedness, to name a few)-vircues that are all too easily undervalued relative 
to Al's instrumental virtues of raw speed and efficiency. Additionally, productive 
AI- human collaborations-the chief goal of many researchers-will be far more 
difficult if AI and human agents cannot grasp one another's manner of reasoning, 
explain the basis of their decisions to one another, or pose critical questions to 
one another. 
After all, if a human cannot reliably query an AI-enabled robot as to the spe-
cific evidence and chain of reasoning by means of which it arrived at its decision, 
how can he or she reliably assess the decision's validity? Human supervisors of AI 
agents cannot effoctively do their job if their subordinate is a mute "black box." 
For this reason, many AI designers are looking for ways to increase the transpar-
ency of machine reasoning. For example, internal confidence measures reported 
alongside a given choice allow a human to give less credibility to decisions with 
a low confidence value. Still, the problem of algorithmic opacity remains a signif-
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22.3.2 Algorithmic Opacity and Hidden Machine Bias 
In addition to frustrating meaningful human oversight of AI, "black boxed" or 
opaque algorithmic processes can perpetuate and reinforce morally and episce-
mically harmful biases. For example, racial, gender, or socioeconomic biases that 
originate in human minds are commonly embedded in the htm1an-generated 
datasets used co train or "educate" machine systems. These data define the "world" 
chat an artificial agent "knows." Yet the effect of human-biased data on machine 
outputs is easily obscured by several factors, making chose biases more harmful 
and resistant co eradication. 
One factor is algorithmic opacity itself. If I cannot know what features of a 
given dataset were singled om by a network's hidden layers as relevant and action-
able, then I will be uncertain whether the network's decision rested on a harm-
ful racial or gender bias encoded somewhere in that data. Another factor is our 
cultural tendency to think about robots and computers as inherently "objective" 
and "rational;' and thus materially incapable of the kinds of emotional and psy-
chological responses (e.g., fear, disgust, anger, shame) that typically produce irra-
tional and harmful social biases. Even scientists who understand the mechanisms 
through which human bias can infect machine intelligence are often surprised to 
discover the extent of such bias in machine outputs-even from inputs thought 
to be relatively unbiased. 
For example, a team of Boston University and Microsoft researchers found 
significant gender biases in machine "word embeddings" trained on a large body 
of Google News reports (Bolukbasi et al. 2016). They remark that data generated 
by "professional journalises" (as opposed to data sourced from internet message 
boards, for example) might have been expected to carry "little gender bias"; yet 
the machine outputs strongly reAected many harmful gender stereotypes ( 2016, 
3 ). They observed char "che same system that solved [other) reasonable analogies 
will offensively answer 'man is to computer programmer as woman is to x' with 
x = hornemaker" (3). The system also reAecced "strong" racial stereotypes (15) . 
To see how such biases could produce direct harm, just imagine chis same system 
implemented in an AI agent casked with providing college counseling to young 
men and women or with ranking employment applications for human resources 
managers ac a large tech firm. 
Indeed, hidden biases in AI algorithms and training data invite unjust out-
comes or policies in predictive policing, lending, education, housing, healthcare, 
and employment, to name just a few sectors of AI implementation. Racial bias 
has already been found in facial recognition algorithms (Orcutt 2016) and, even 
more disturbingly, in machine-generated scores widely used by judges in criminal 
courts to predict the likelihood that a criminal defendant will reoffend (Angwin 
er al. 2016). Such scores shape judicial decisions about parole eligibility, length 
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of sentence, and the type of correctional facility to which a defendant will be 
subjected. A predictive engine that assigns higher risk scores to black defendants 
than to white defendants who are otherwise similar, and that systematically over-
estimates the likelihood of black recidivism while systematically underestimating 
the rate of recidivism among whites, not only reflects an existing social injustice, 
but perpetuates and rein.forces it-both by giving it the stamp of machine objec-
tivity and neutrality associated with computer-generated calculations and by 
encouraging further injustices ( disproportionately longer and harsher sentences) 
against black defendants and their families. 
Perhaps humans can learn to view biased machine algorithms and outputs 
with greater suspicion. Yet machine bias can also infect the judgments of less 
critically minded agents, such as robots tasked with identifying shoplifters, con-
ducting anti-burglary patrols, or assisting with crowd-control or anti-terrorism 
operations. Such uses of robots are widely anticipated; indeed, automated secur-
ity robots are already on the market (Vincent 2016). Perhaps we can train algo-
rithms to expose hidden biases in such systems, for unless they can be effectively 
addressed, machine biases are virtually guaranteed to perpetuate and amplify 
many forms of social injustice. 
22.3.3 Widespread Technological Unemployment 
In the early nineteenth century, when weaving machines were introduced in 
England, great resentment and fear arose among textile workers who saw their 
jobs th reatened. An organized revolt against the machines led by so-called 
Luddites (after a mythical hero known as "Ned Ludd" or "King Ludd") had suf-
ficient cultural impact that, to this day, people who object to new developments 
in technology are known as "Neo-Luddites." Yet despite their very real harms, 
the disruptions of the Industrial Revolution produced social goods that not 
many would be willing to surrender for the old world: longer life spans, higher 
standards ofliving in industrialized nations, and, eventually, great expansions in 
skilled employment. The early computer revolution produced similar cultural 
disruptions, but a range of new public benefits and a booming market for jobs in 
the "knowledge economy." 
Yet unlike other waves of machine automation, emerging advances in AI and 
robotics technology are now viewed as a significant threat to employees who per-
form mental, not just manual, labor. Automated systems already perform many 
tasks that traditionally required advanced education, such as legal discovery, 
reading x-ray films, grading essays, rating loan applications, and writing news arti-
cles (Kaplan 2015). IBM's \Vatson has been employed as a teaching assistant in an 
online college class on AI-without students discerning the non-human identity 
of their trusted TA "Jill" (Korn 2016). 
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The large-scale effects of AI and associated automation on human labor, social 
security, political stability, and economic equality are uncertain, but an Oxford 
study concludes that as many as 47% of U.S. jobs are at significant risk from 
advances in machine learning and mobile robotics (Frey and Osborne 2013, 1-2). 
Sectors at highest risk for displacement by automated systems include transpor-
tation and logistics (including driving jobs), sales, service, construction, office 
and administrative support, and production (Frey and Osborne 2013, 35). It is 
worth noting that the Oxford researchers were relatively conservative in their 
predictions of machine intelligence, suggesting that non-routine, high-skilled 
jobs associated with healthcare, scientific research, education, and the arts are at 
relatively low risk due to their heavy reliance on human creativity and social intel-
ligence (Frey and Osborne 2013, 40). Yet more recent gains in machine learning 
have led many to anticipate a boom in artificial agents like the university TA "Jill 
\Vatson": able ro compete with humans even in jobs that traditionaHy required 
social, creative, and intellectual capacities. 
Such developments will profoundly challenge economic and political stabil-
ity in a world already suffering from rising economic inequality, political disaf-
fection, and growing class divisions. They also impact fundamental human values 
like autonomy and dignity, and make it even less certain that the benefits and 
risks of scientific and technical advances will be distributed among citizens and 
nations in a manner that is not merely efficient and productive, but also good 
and ju.st. 
22. 3.4 Psychological and Emotional Manipulation 
of Humans by Al 
The moral impacts of Al on human emotions, sociality, relationship bonding, 
public discourse, and civic character have only begun to be explored. Research in 
social AI for robots and other artificial agents is exploding, and vigorous efforts 
to develop carebots for the elderly, sexbots for the lonely, chatbots for customers 
and patients, and artificial assistants like Siri and Corrana for all of us are just the 
tip of the iceberg. The ethical questions that can arise in this domain are virtually 
limitless, since human sociality is the primary field of ethical action. 
One deep worry about social AI is the well-documented tendency of humans 
to form robust emotional attachments to machines that simulate human emo-
tional responses, even when the simulations are quite superficial (Turkle 2011 ). 
The behavior of artificial agents can also foster harmful delusions in hw11ans, who 
may incorrectly perceive them as having human traits such as sentience, empathy, 
moral conscience, or loyalty. Thus humans are deeply vulnerable co emotional 
and psychological manipulation by AI and robotic systems coldly designed to 
exploit us for commercial, political, or other purposes (Scheutz 2012). Imagine, 
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for example, the public harm that could be done by a chatbot programmed to 
seek out and form emotionally manipulative online relationships with youngvot-
ers or lonely seniors and then, once a bond is formed, to start interjecting deliber-
ately manipulative messages about a political candidate whom the chatbot deeply 
"fears" or "loves." 
Public education about the inability of robots to have feelings or form gen-
uine bonds with humans will likely not be enough to prevent such harms, since 
even chose with an insider's knowledge of the technology can find themselves 
responding to such powerful delusions (Scheutz 2012). It is thus imperative that 
lawmakers and developers of AI-enabled social agents begin to work together on 
ethical and legal guidelines for restricting or prohibiting harmful manipulation, 
particularly when it undermines human autonomy or damages our vital interests. 
22.3.5 Automation Bias 
A related ethical concern about human-robot/ AI interaction is the psycholog-
ical phenomenon of automation bias, in which humans greatly overestimate or 
rely unduly upon the capabilities of computerized systems (Cummings 2004). 
Automation bias can result from flawed expectations of computerized systems 
as infallible or inherently superior to human judgment, from time pressures 
or information overloads that make it difficult for humans to properly eval-
uate a computer's decision, or from overextending warranted confidence in a 
machine's actual capabilities into an area of action in which confidence is not 
warranted. The latter is often elicited on the basis of only shallow similarities 
with intelligent human behavior, as when pedestrians in Puerto Rico walked 
behind a self-parking Volvo in a garage, erroneously trusting the car (which 
lacked an optional "pedestrian-detection" package) to know not to back over a 
person (Hill 2015). 
Automation bias has been cited as one possible factor in the 1988 downing of 
Iran Air 655 by che USS Vincennes, which caused che death of 290 civilians ( Gruc 
2013; Gal.liott 2015, 217). Operators of the Aegis anti-aircraft system that mis-
takenly identified the airliner as a military jet had ample information to warrant 
overriding che identification, but failed to do so. As artificially incelligenc and 
robotic systems are given increasing power to effect or incite action in the physi-
cal world, often with serious consequences for human safety and well-being, it is 
ethically imperative that the psychological dimension of human-AI and human-
robot interactions be better understood. Such knowledge must guide efforts by 
AI and robotic system designers and users to reduce or eliminate harmful auto-
mation bias and other psychological misalignments between human interests and 
artificial cognition. 
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22.4. Public Fears and the Long-Term Future of Al 
\Vhile many computer scientists consider AI to be simply an especially interest-
ing aspect of cheir field, challenging to program, and sometimes frus trating if ic 
does not behave as expected, in the popular press AI is frequently framed as a 
threat to humanity's survival. Elon Musk, founder and CEO of Space X and Tesla 
Motors, has warned the public that with AI we are "summoning the demon"; sim-
ilar warnings about Al's existential risks, that is, its potential to threaten meaning-
ful human existence, have been voiced by public figures such as Stephen Hawking 
and Bill Gares, alongwich a hose of AI and robotics researchers (Standage 2016).8 
The urgency of their warnings is motivated by the unprecedented acceleration of 
developments in the field, especially in machine learning.9 
Isaac Asimov's "Laws of Robotics" were an early fictional at tempt to chink 
through a sec of guidelines for the control of intelligent robots (Asimov 2004). 
Today, however, technologists and ethicists muse revisit this challenge in the face 
of profound public ambivalence about an Al-driven future. W hile many of us 
implicitly trust our car's directional sense or our tax software's financial acuity 
more than we trust our own, there is growing uncertainty about Al's long-term 
safety and compatibility with human interests. 
Public distrust of AI systems could inhibit wider adoption and consumer 
engagement with these technologies, a consequence that AI researchers have 
good reason to want to avoid. Many public fears can be moderated by better 
education and communication from AI researchers about what AI today is 
(skillful at well-defined cognitive casks) and is not (sentient, self-aware, malev-
olent or benevolent, or even robustly intelligent in the manner of humans). 
Moreover, we would all benefit from an outward expansion of public concern 
to the less apocalyptic, but more pressing ethical challenges of AI addressed in 
this chapter. 
While talk about "Skynet" scenarios and "robot overlords" sounds like over-
heated speculation to many AI and robotics researchers- who are otten overjoyed 
just to make a robot that can have a halfway convincing conversation or walk up 
an unstable hillside- growing public anxieties about AI and robotics technology 
may force researchers to pay more attention to such fears and at least begin an early 
dialogue about long-term control strategies for artificial agents. One does not have 
to predict a Terminator-like future to recognize that the ethical challenges pre-
sented by AI will not remain fixed in their present state; as the technology grows 
in power, complexity, and scale, so will its risks and benefits ( Cameron 1984). For 
this reason, the ethics of artificial intelligence will be a rapidly moving target-and 
humanity as a whole must make a dedicated effort to keep up. 
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Notes 
l. There is much debate (even between this chapter's authors) about whether com-
puter science, and artificial intelligence research in particular, is a genuine science 
that smdies and models natural phenomena (such as informational or computational 
processes) or is a branch of engineering. 
2. An excellent introduction to rhe field appears in Russell and Norvig (2010). 
3. IBM \'(/arson, for example, prefers rhe term "augmented intelligence" or "cognitive 
computing" to "artificial intelligence;' to emphasize \Varson's potential to enhance 
and empower human intelligence, not render it superfluous (IBM Research 2016). 
4. Research in AGI continues, if slowly, and is the central focus of organizations such as 
the Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI). Many researchers who work on 
AGI are actively working to mitigate its considerable risks (Yudkowsky 2008). 
5. A related study is that of machine ethics: designing agents with artificial mom! imel-
ligence. Because of space limitations, we restrict our focus here to the ethical chal-
lenges AI presents for h11mt111 moral agents. 
6. Depending on whether the emergent behavior is undesirable or useful to humans, 
emergence can be a "bug" (as with the 2010 Flash Crash caused by feedback loops 
among interacting global financial software systems) or a "feature" (as when an algo-
rithm produces emergent and seemingly "intelligent" swarming behavior among a 
networked group of micro-robots). 
7. Strictly speaking, machine learning networks do not make "errors" - they only 
generate unexpected or statistically rare outcomes that, from a human perspec-
tive, are not well aligned with programmers' or users' real-world goals for the 
system. But since human goals (for example, "promote human safe ty") are no t 
actually understood by the system (however statist ically effective it may be at 
reaching them), it cannot truly be said to "err" in producing a result incongruous 
with such a goal. The mistake, if there is one, is a gap or misalignment between 
what the machine's code and network weightings actually do and what its pro-
grammers wanted it to do. Good programming, training, and testing protocols 
can minimize such gaps, but it is virtually impossible to ensure that every such gap 
is el iminated. 
8. See the open letter on Al from the Future of Life Institute (2005), with more than 
eight thousand signatories; sec also Bostrom (2014). 
9. Indeed, a standard textbook in AI, which twenty years ago had some three hundred 
pages, now, in its third edition, includes well over a thousand pages (Russell and 
Norvig 2010). 
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